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On the Core of Routing Games with Revenues∗
Arantza Estévez-Fernández1, 2 Peter Borm1 Marc Meertens1 Hans Reijnierse1
Abstract
Traveling salesman problems with revenues form a generalization of traveling salesman problems. Here,
next to travel costs an explicit revenue is generated by visiting a city. We analyze routing problems with
revenues, where a predetermined route on all cities determines the tours along subgroups. Corresponding
routing games with revenues are analyzed. It is shown that these games have a nonempty core and a
complete description of the core is provided.
Keywords: Routing problems, revenues, core.
JEL Classification Numbers: C71
1 Introduction
In a traveling salesman (TS) situation a salesman, starting in his home city, has to visit a set of cities exactly
once and has to come back to its home city at the end of the journey. Associating travel costs to connections
the problem is how to find a tour with minimal cost. It is known that TS problems are NP-hard in general.
For a survey on TS problems we refer to Lawler, Lenstra, Kan, Shmoys and Hurkens (1997).
Fishburn and Pollak (1983) introduced the cost allocation problem that arises when each city (except the
home city) corresponds to a player. The cost allocation is concerned with a fair allocation of the joint costs
of the cheapest tour. This cost allocation problem was first studied within the framework of game theory by
Potters, Curiel and Tijs (1992) by introducing TS games. In a TS game, the value of a coalition of cities is the
∗The authors thank Herbert Hamers for his helpful discussion and comments.
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value of the cheapest tour in the TS problem associated to the coalition. Here, only (and exactly) the cities in
the coalition will be visited. If the triangular inequalities are satisfied every 3-, 4-, and 5-person TS game has
a nonempty core (cf. Potters et al. (1992), Tamir (1989), and Kuipers (1993)). In the same setting however
Tamir (1989) provides an example of a 6-person TS game with an empty core. In Estévez-Fernández, Borm
and Hamers (2003) it is seen that these results can be generalized to multiple (longest) traveling salesman
(M(L)TS) games. In an MTS problem the salesman has to visit each city exactly once except for the home
city which can be revisited as many times as desired. In a longest traveling salesman (LTS) problem there
are profits associated to connections instead of travel costs. Hence, the objective of an LTS problem is to
find a tour with maximal profit.
In Potters et al. (1992) also the class of fixed routing games is introduced. Here, the route along all cities
is predetermined (e.g. by restrictions in the agenda of the salesman) and this tour determines the tours along
all possible coalitions. The value of a coalition of a routing game is defined as the cost associated to the tour
that visits the members of the coalition in the same relative order as in the predetermined tour. Potters
et al. (1992) show that routing games have a nonempty core if the predetermined tour is an optimal tour for
the related TS problem. Derks and Kuipers (1997) give a time efficient algorithm to provide core elements
of a routing game.
This paper studies routing problems with revenues (RR-problems): next to travel costs and a predeter-
mined route on all cities, revenues of a visit are explicitly modeled and taken into account. Note that since
the revenues obtained by the visit of a salesman are explicitly given, it might be the case that some of the
cities will not be visited by the salesman if the objective is to maximize total joint profit. We will assume
that the predetermined route is optimal in this sense and indeed visits all cities. Still, it might be optimal
for a coalition not to visit all its cities in the prescribed relative order. Hence, the value of the associated
routing game for a specific coalition is defined as the maximum attainable profit by one of its subcoalitions
if the salesman visits all cities in this subcoalition in the relative order given by the predetermined route on
all cities. We will show that every routing game has a nonempty core. Moreover, a complete description of
the core is provided.
The idea of analyzing cost problems arising from a general service facility by taking explicitly into account
the profits that the service will generate is not new. It was first studied in Littlechild and Owen (1976) within
the framework of airport problems, with a more recent follow up in Brânzei, Iñarra, Tijs and Zarzuelo (2003).
Meertens and Potters (2004) consider fixed tree games with revenues. Suijs, Borm, Hamers, Quant and Koster
(2005) study the sharing of costs and revenues within a public network communication structure.
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2 Routing games with revenues
In this section we introduce routing games with revenues.
Let N = {1, 2, . . . , n} denote the set of cities that a traveling salesman has to visit. Let N0 := N ∪ {0}
where 0 denotes the traveling salesman’s home city. Let C = (cij) be an N0×N0-matrix where cij represents
the costs to go from city i to city j. Throughout this article we will assume that:
(i) cii = 0 for all i ∈ N0,
(ii) cij = cji for all i, j ∈ N0, (symmetry)
(iii) cij ≤ cik + ckj for all i, j, k ∈ N0. (triangle inequalities)
Whenever city i ∈ N is visited by the traveling salesman, a revenue bi ≥ 0 is obtained. Due to the explicit
modeling of the revenues we assume that the salesman, who starts from city 0, will visit each city at most
once, and only returns to city 0 at the end of the journey.
Let R ⊂ N and set R0 := R ∪ {0}. A bijection π : R0 → R0 is called a cyclic permutation if
min{t ∈ N |πt(i) = i} = |R| + 1 for every i ∈ R0. We will denote by Π(R) the set of all cyclic permutations
on R0. A cyclic permutation π corresponds to a tour along R: it starts in 0 and visits each city in R exactly
once returning to 0 at the end of the trip. Here, π(i) is the city immediately visited after city i for all i ∈ R0.
For convenience, we will sometimes denote city 0 also by n + 1 and in particular π(i) = n + 1 means that i
is the last city on the tour. For π ∈ Π(R), we denote by c(π,R) the cost associated to the tour induced by
π, i.e., c(π,R) =
∑
i∈R0




The total profit p(R) obtained when the salesman has visited all cities in R according to a tour with minimal
cost is




Due to the revenue structure it may be more profitable for N not to make a (complete) tour on N itself
but on a subset R ⊂ N , leaving N \ R unvisited. Therefore, the optimization problem for N boils down to





From now on we will assume that it is optimal to visit all cities in N via the cyclic permutation π̂ ∈ Π(N).
We will also assume without loss of generality that
the optimal order π̂ for N is given by 0 − 1 − 2 − . . . − n − 0. (2.1)
Hence, v(N) = p(N).
Associating each city in N with a player, the question we would like to address is how to share v(N)
among the players. For this we choose the “routing” approach, where π̂ determines the order in which
potential subcoalitions are visited.
For S ⊂ N , the cyclic permutation π̂S ∈ Π(S) induced by π̂ is obtained from π̂ by skipping the cities in
N \ S and leaving the order of the remaining cities unchanged. Formally, π̂S is given by
π̂S(i) = π̂
t(i)(i) for every i ∈ S0
where t(i) := min{t ∈ N | π̂t(i) ∈ S0}. With a minor abuse of notation we will denote c(π̂S , S) by c(π̂, S).
A coalition S ⊂ N need not decide on the complete tour π̂S on S: a tour π̂R on a subset R ⊂ S may be
more profitable. Hence, we define the value vπ̂(S) in the routing game (N, vπ̂) by
vπ̂(S) = max
R⊂S
{b(R) − c(π̂, R)}
Note that vπ̂(N) = v(N).
Example 2.1. Consider the routing problem with revenues represented in Figure 1 where the numbers at












Figure 1: The routing problem with revenues in Example 2.1.
Note that assumption (2.1) is satisfied. The associated routing game with revenues has values: vπ̂({1}) = 3,
vπ̂({2}) = 0, vπ̂({3}) = 3, vπ̂({1, 2}) = 5, vπ̂({1, 3}) = 7, vπ̂({2, 3}) = 3 and vπ̂(N) = 9. 3
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Note that if the revenues are so high that the salesman will visit all cities of every coalition, then the
routing game with revenues is strategically equivalent1 to a routing game à la Potters et al. (1992) and Derks
and Kuipers (1997).
3 The Core
In this section we will study the core of routing games with revenues. We will show that routing games with
revenues have a nonempty core. Moreover, we will give an intuitive interpretation of all core elements.
Let (N, v) be a cooperative game. Recall that the core of (N, v) is given by
Core(v) = {x ∈ RN |x(N) = v(N), x(S) ≥ v(S) for all S ∈ 2N},
i.e., the core is the set of efficient allocations of v(N) such that there is no coalition with an incentive to
split off.
In the following example we illustrate that taking into account revenues has a definite impact on the
structure of the core.












Figure 2: The routing problem with revenues in Example 3.1.
It is readily checked that assumption (2.1) is satisfied and that vπ̂(S) = 0 for every S ⊂ N , S 6= N , and
vπ̂(N) = 2. Therefore,
Core(vπ̂) = conv{(2, 0, 0), (0, 2, 0), (0, 0, 2)}.
1Here, we make a slight abuse of language when we say that a routing game with revenues is strategically equivalent to a (cost)
routing game. We mean that there exist k ∈ R++, a ∈ RN and (N, c), a (cost) routing game, such that vπ̂(S) = a(S) − kc(S)
for every S ⊂ N .
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Consider now the associated (cost) routing game à la Potters et al. (1992) and Derks and Kuipers (1997) in
which the revenues are explicitly not considered: they are high enough. One readily verifies that cπ̂({1}) = 2,
cπ̂({2}) = 6, cπ̂({3}) = 6, cπ̂({1, 2}) = 6, cπ̂({1, 3}) = 8, cπ̂({2, 3}) = 8 and c(N) = 8. Here,
Core(cπ̂)
2 = conv{(2, 0, 6), (0, 2, 6), (0, 6, 2), (2, 4, 2)}.
Hence, there is not an obvious relation between Core(cπ̂) and Core(vπ̂). Moreover, it is readily checked that
the above routing game with revenues is not strategically equivalent to any routing game à la Potters et al.
(1992) and Derks and Kuipers (1997). 3
Next, we will show that a routing game with revenues, (N, vπ̂), corresponding to travel cost matrix
C ∈ RN0×N0 and revenue vector b ∈ RN has a nonempty core.























xij = 0 for all i ∈ {1, . . . , n}; (3.3)
xij ≥ 0 for all i, j ∈ {0, 1, . . . , n, n + 1} with i < j. (3.4)
with b0 = bn+1 := 0 and cin+1 := ci0 and where e
S ∈ RN is a vector of zeros and ones with eSi = 1 if i ∈ S
and eSi = 0 otherwise.
It is readily checked that LP(S) is feasible and bounded. Here, xij can be interpreted as the “amount
of flow that goes from i to j”. The profit obtained per unit of flow from i to j is bj − cij for every i and
j such that 1 ≤ i < j ≤ n + 1 and the objective function is to maximize the total profit as represented in
(3.1). Equation (3.2) indicates that the total flow “arriving” at city i can not exceed one unit of flow, i.e.,
one can think of this as a capacity restriction on the nodes. Equation (3.3) makes sure that the amount of
flow “arriving” at i equals the amount of flow “leaving” i.
Note that the game (N,u) with u(S) defined as the optimal value of LP(S) for S ⊂ N , is a linear pro-
duction game and therefore it has a nonempty core (cf. Owen (1975)).
2The core of a cost game is defined as Core(c) = {x ∈ RN | x(N) = v(N), x(S) ≤ c(S) for all S ∈ 2N}.
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Lemma 3.1.
(i) u(S) ≥ vπ̂(S) for every S ⊂ N .
(ii) u(N) = vπ̂(N).
Proof: (i) Let S ⊂ N and R ⊂ S such that
vπ̂(S) = b(R) − c(π̂, R).





1 if i ∈ {0, i1, . . . , ir−1} and j = π̂R(i), or i = ir and j = n + 1,
0 otherwise.








(bj − cij)xij = bi1 + . . . + bir − (c0i1 + ci1i2 + . . . + cir−1ir + c0ir ) = vπ̂(S).
(ii) By (i) it suffices to show that u(N) ≤ vπ̂(N). Note that LP(N) is a transportation problem with
{0, 1, . . . , n} the set of sources, {1, . . . , n, n + 1} the set of sinks, and such that there are no links going from
a source i to a sink j with i > j and the reward when going from i ∈ N to itself is zero. Then, there exists
an integral optimal solution, x̄ = (x̄ij)0≤i<j≤n+1, for LP(N) (see Nemhauser and Wolsey (1988), Chapter
I.3, Corollary 5.2). Moreover,
(i) x̄ij ∈ {0, 1} for every i, j with 0 ≤ i < j ≤ n + 1 by equations (3.2) and (3.4).
(ii) If
∑i−1
k=0 x̄ki = 1, then there exists a unique k(i) ∈ {0, . . . , i − 1} such that x̄k(i)i = 1 by (i).
(iii) If
∑i−1






i=1 x̄in+1 by equation (3.3).
Let N(x̄) := {i ∈ N |
∑i−1
k=0 x̄ki = 1} and let {i1, . . . , ir} = {i ∈ N(x̄) | x̄0i = 1}. Let t(il) be the smallest
integer such that j t(il)(il) = n + 1. We define
Nl(x̄) = {j
t(il) | t ∈ {1, . . . , t(il) − 1}
for l ∈ {1, . . . , r}. It is readily checked that N1(x̄), . . . , Nr(x̄) is a partition of N(x̄). Moreover, note that this
partition implies that r tours, π1 ∈ Π(N1(x̄)), . . . , π
r ∈ Π(Nr(x̄)), will be followed in the optimal solution,
where tour πl is given by 0 − il − . . . − j










Figure 3: Representation of the tours given by πl.
Define π̃ ∈ Π(N(x̄)) by 0− i1− . . .− j
t(i1)−1(i1)− i2− . . .− j




































≤ b(∪rl=1Nl(x̄)) − c(π̃,∪
r
l=1Nl(x̄))
≤ b(∪rl=1Nl(x̄)) − c(∪
r
l=1Nl(x̄))
≤ b(N) − c(N) = vπ̂(N)
where the first inequality holds by the triangular inequalities, the second one holds by definition of
c(∪rl=1Nl(x̄)) and the last one by assumption (2.1). 2
Note that if two games (N, v) and (N,u) are such that v(S) ≤ u(S) for every S ⊂ N , v(N) = u(N), and
Core(u) 6= ∅, then Core(v) 6= ∅ and Core(u) ⊂ Core(v). Hence, as a direct consequence of Lemma 3.1 we have
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that a routing game with revenues has a nonempty core.
Theorem 3.2. Any routing game with revenues has a nonempty core.
The following result gives a full description of the core of a routing game with revenues. It states that an
allocation x belongs to the core of the game if each coordinate xi can be written as xi = bi−ci−1i +zi−1−zi.
This can be interpreted in the following way: First of all, player i obtains the revenue bi when the salesman
visits its city and has to pay the travel costs ci−1i from city i − 1 to city i. Next, since player i − 1 also
gets revenues from the visit, it will help player i with the travel costs by paying a compensation zi−1. In a
similar way, player i will help player i + 1 with the travel costs of the trip from city i to city i + 1 with zi.
Equation (3.6) below reflects that player i will never compensate i + 1 more than the total amount he gets
once i − 1 has paid the compensation. Equation (3.7) reflects the fact that player j + 1 indeed prefers that
the salesman comes from player j instead of another player i(< j).
Theorem 3.3. Let (N, vπ̂) be a routing game with revenues corresponding to travel cost matrix C ∈ R
N0×N0
and revenue vector b ∈ RN . Then, the following three assertions are equivalent.
(i) x ∈ Core(vπ̂).
(ii) x ≥ 0, x(N) = vπ̂(N), and x(N \ S) ≥ vπ̂(N \ S) for every S ⊂ N with S = {i, i + 1, . . . , j} and i ≤ j.
(iii) xi := bi − ci−1i + zi−1 − zi for all i ∈ {1, . . . , n} with
z0 := 0, zn := c0n (3.5)
zi − zi−1 ≤ bi − ci−1i for all i ∈ {1, . . . , n} (3.6)
zj − zi ≥ cjj+1 − cij+1 for all i, j ∈ {0, 1, . . . , n} with i < j. (3.7)
Proof: (i)⇒(ii) is immediate and therefore omitted.
(ii)⇒(iii) Let x ∈ RN satisfy the conditions mentioned in assertion (ii) of the theorem. Define the vector
z ∈ RN0 as follows:
z0 := 0
zi := bi − ci−1i + zi−1 − xi for every i ∈ {1, . . . , n}.






k=1 xk for all i ∈ {1, . . . , n}. Hence,












ck−1k) = cnn+1 = c0n
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where the second equality follows from x(N) = vπ̂(N). Consequently, equation (3.5) holds.
With respect to equation (3.6), clearly x ≥ 0 implies zi − zi−1 ≤ bi − ci−1i.
Next, we will show equation (3.7), i.e., zj−zi ≥ cjj+1−cij+1 for all i, j ∈ {0, 1, . . . , n} with i < j. Suppose
there exist i, j ∈ {0, 1, . . . , n} with i < j be such that zj−zi < cjj+1−cij+1. Define S = {i+1, . . . , j}. Clearly,
if we can show that x(N \ S) < vπ̂(N \ S) we will arrive at a contradiction with one of the assumptions in
(ii). Indeed,
x(N \S) = b(N \S) − [c01 + . . . + ci−1i + cjj+1 + . . . + cn−1n]
+[z0 + . . . + zi−1 + zj + . . . + zn−1] − [z1 + . . . + zi + zj+1 + . . . + zn]
= b(N \S) − [c01 + . . . + ci−1i + cjj+1 + . . . + cn−1n] + zj − zi − zn
= b(N \S) − [c01 + . . . + ci−1i + cjj+1 + . . . + cn−1n + cn0] + zj − zi
< b(N \S) − [c01 + . . . + ci−1i + cjj+1 + . . . + cn−1n + cn0] + cjj+1 − cij+1
= b(N \S) − [c01 + . . . + ci−1i + cij+1 + . . . + cn−1n + c0n]
= b(N \S) − c(π̂N\S , N \S)
≤ vπ̂(N \S),
where the second equality follows from z0 = 0, the third one is a consequence of zn = c0n, the strict inequality
follows from the assumption and the weak inequality is by definition of vπ̂.
(iii)⇒(i) Let z ∈ RN0 satisfy the conditions (3.5), (3.6), and (3.7) mentioned in assertion (iii) of the theorem.
Define xi := bi − ci−1i + zi−1 − zi for all 1 ≤ i ≤ n. It is readily checked that x(N) = vπ̂(N). Let S ⊂ N
be a coalition, and let R := {i1, . . . , ir} ⊂ S be such that vπ̂(S) = b(R) − c(π̂R, R). It suffices to prove that
x(S) ≥ vπ̂(S). For this, note that











































































cikik+1 − c0i1 − c0ir
= b(R) − c(π̂R, R)
= vπ̂(S).
Here, the first inequality is a consequence of equation (3.6) which implies xi ≥ 0 for every i ∈ N , the second
inequality follows by applying equation (3.7) to j = i1 − 1, i = 0 and to j = n, i = ir and the second one is
also an immediate consequence of equation (3.7). 2
Consider the vector x ∈ RN defined recursively by
xi = vπ̂(N) − max
k≤i
{vπ̂(N \ {k, . . . , i}) + x({k, . . . , i − 1})}. (3.8)
for i ∈ {1, . . . , n}. This allocation can be interpreted as follows. Assume only connected coalitions (i.e.,
coalitions {k, k + 1, . . . , i}) are allowed to step out of the negotiations on the allocation of vπ̂(N) and
stepping out is decided recursively by the individual players. Consider that player i wants to step out. If the
coalition {k, k + 1, . . . , i} decides to step out, the players in N \ {k, k + 1, . . . , i} will further negotiate the
allocation of vπ̂(N \ {k, k +1, . . . , i}) and each player j ∈ {k, k +1, . . . , i− 1} already got xj . Hence, player i
will be left with vπ̂(N)− [vπ̂(N \{k, . . . , i})+x({k, . . . , i−1})]. Having no influence on “earlier” stepping out
player i can only claim the minimum compensation over the set of all possible connected coalitions {k, . . . , i}
with 1 ≤ k ≤ i which is reflected in (3.8).
It turns out that the allocation x defined by equation (3.8) is a core element of vπ̂. This result is an
immediate consequence of the description of the core by coalitions N \ {k, . . . , i} given in Theorem 3.3 and
Theorem 4 in Derks and Kuipers (1997). Hence, the proof is omitted.
Theorem 3.4. Let (N, vπ̂) be a routing game with revenues corresponding to travel cost matrix C ∈ R
N0×N0
and revenue vector b ∈ RN . Let x be defined as in equation (3.8). Then, x ∈ Core(vπ̂).
4 Conclusions
In this paper we have analyzed the core of routing games with revenues in which the predetermined route
is optimal for the associated combinatorial problem and visits all cities in N . Next, we provide an example
that illustrates that our assumption (2.1) (i.e., the salesman visits all cities) is not restrictive. It turns out
that if the salesman only visits some of the cities, those that are unvisited will receive a payoff of zero in any
core allocation and the various results provided in the previous sections are still valid.
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Example 4.1. Consider the routing problem with revenues represented in Figure 5 where the numbers at












Figure 5: The routing problem with revenues in Example 4.1.
It is readily seen that the optimal tour for this situation only visits the cities 1, 2, and 3 in the order 0−1−2−
3−0 denoted by π̂. Hence the coalitional values of the routing game are: vπ̂({1}) = 1, vπ̂({2}) = 1, vπ̂({3}) =
0, vπ̂({4}) = 0, vπ̂({1, 2}) = 4, vπ̂({1, 3}) = 2, vπ̂({1, 4}) = 1, vπ̂({2, 3}) = 3, vπ̂({2, 4}) = 1, vπ̂({3, 4}) = 0,
vπ̂({1, 2, 3}) = 6, vπ̂({1, 2, 4}) = 4, vπ̂({1, 3, 4}) = 2, vπ̂({2, 3, 4}) = 3 and vπ̂(N) = 6. Here, player 4 is a zero
player and the core of the game is Core(vπ̂) = conv{(3, 3, 0, 0), (3, 1, 2, 0), (2, 4, 0, 0), (1, 4, 1, 0), (1, 3, 2, 0)}.
Note that the core can still be described by means of the cost of the tour, the vector of revenues, and a
vector of compensations as in Theorem 3.3. 3
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Brânzei, R., Iñarra, E., Tijs, S. and Zarzuelo, J. (2003), ‘A simple algorithm for the nucleolus of airport
profit problems’, CentER Discussion Paper 2003-50 . Tilburg University, Tilburg, The Netherlands.
Derks, J. and Kuipers, J. (1997), ‘On the core of routing games’, International Journal of Game Theory
26, 193–205.
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